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a b s t r a c t
We introduce taste for variety in a one-sector model of differentiated products with productive
labor externalities, considering two OLG countries, one with wage rigidity and the other with full
employment. After opening the borders to capital mobility and intra-industry trade, steady state output
and real wages improve in the full employment country and the saddle path stability, characterizing
this country under autarky, will prevail in the globalized world if this economy is big enough.
Unemployment increases in the country with wage rigidity and, for intermediate plausible values of
both the current propensity to consume and of the labor externality, indeterminacy, which emerges
in the rigid wage economy in autarky, will be exported to the world if this country is relatively big.
Finally, we show that globalization leads to the appearance of stable deterministic cycles in activity,
employment and the trade account, both through flip and Hopf bifurcations, when the world steady
state is locally determinate, for empirically plausible low degrees of labor externalities. This implies
that trade cycles occur in the absence of shocks to fundamentals, and even without uncertainty in
expectations.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The impact of globalization on unemployment and wages has
een a topic of interest for workers and policy makers in de-
eloped countries, fostering the attention of economists and the
mergence of a growing literature. Several papers have shown
hat different labor market institutions in the trading partners
ffect comparative advantage in two-sector models, determining
he pattern and the impact of inter-industry trade.1 However,
owadays, intra-industry trade, i.e. trade where each country im-
ports and exports simultaneously different varieties of the same
industry, represents a significant and increasing percentage of the
trade between developed countries.2 Accordingly, we consider
one sector model of differentiated goods, where comparative
✩ Financial support from ‘‘Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia’’ under the
PTDC/EGE-ECO/27884/2017 is gratefully acknowledged.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: antoineleriche@scu.edu.cn (A. Le Riche), tlb@ucp.pt
T. Lloyd-Braga), lrm@ucp.pt (L. Modesto).
1 See Cuñat and Melitz (2012), Boulhol (2011) and Helpman and Itskhoki
2010).
2 Indeed, according to the OECD, more than 60% of U.S. trade, and 65%
f European trade, is intra-industry trade. See http://www.oecd.org/economy/
utlook/2752923.pdf.Please cite this article as:A. Le Riche, T. Lloyd-BragaandL. Modesto, Intra-industry trade,
Economics (2021) 102589, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102589.
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102589
304-4068/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access a
nc-nd/4.0/).advantage plays no role. This was already advocated in the pi-
oneer works of Krugman (1979, 1980), where he remarks that
the prevalence of two-way exchanges of differentiated products
among industrial countries casts serious doubts on the ability of
comparative cost theory to explain international trade, propos-
ing an alternative framework, anchored on economies of scale,
product differentiation and imperfect competition. Here, we focus
on the effects of bilateral intra-industry trade driven by taste for
variety on the level and volatility of employment and activity of
two countries with different labor market institutions. Although
we assume non-stochastic stationary identical preferences and
technologies, the setup considered is able to generate endoge-
nous fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling expectations in aggre-
gate output, employment and the trade account. Several studies
have already analyzed the link between macroeconomic volatility
driven by beliefs and inter-industry trade.3 However, the liter-
ature has not yet addressed the implications of intra-industry
trade.4 Our work fills this gap, investigating whether free-trade
3 See Sim and Ho (2007), Nishimura et al. (2014) and Le Riche (2017).
4 On the empirical side, Hayakawa et al. (2017), using OECD data, find
that this type of trade is particularly volatile. Ardelean et al. (2018), examining
the link between trade and output volatility find that imported varieties make
domestic demand more volatile as additional consumption goods of the same
industry become available.involuntaryunemployment andmacroeconomic stability. Journal ofMathematical
rticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-



























































n differentiated goods driven by taste for variety, and the lib-
ralization of capital movements,5 may stabilize (or destabilize)
he economies with respect to endogenous deterministic and
tochastic fluctuations driven by autonomous volatile changes in
xpectations,6 and whether it may bring welfare gains at the
ountry level.
We consider a two-country overlapping generations model
ith current and future consumption, featuring a sector of dif-
erentiated goods, produced out of labor and capital under in-
reasing returns to scale due to a fixed cost and labor externali-
ies. In this sector there is imperfect competition à la Dixit and
tiglitz (1977), and equilibrium is characterized by a constant
arkup with an endogenous and proyclical number of varieties.
e introduce taste for variety, according to which an increase
f product diversity decreases the aggregate price at the sym-
etric equilibrium (Bénassy, 1996). The model combines and
xtends the closed economy framework with taste for variety
eveloped in Seegmuller (2008), where current consumption is
ot considered, and the two-country model with productive labor
xternalities, international capital mobility but no trade consid-
red in Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010).7 As in the latter, we assume
that the two countries only differ in their labor market structure:
efficiency wages and involuntary unemployment prevail in one
country,8 whereas in the other there is perfect competition in the
labor market and full employment. This framework is particularly
well suited to investigate whether the employment and welfare
effects of intra-industry trade depend on the existing labor mar-
ket structure. This is an important issue as developed countries,
where intra-industry trade is particularly relevant, are character-
ized by different labor market institutions, and it is frequently
conjectured that labor market rigidities may hinder the expected
benefits of trade.
We start by analyzing autarkic equilibria in each country.
We then consider equilibria with free-trade and capital mobility
between the two countries, studying the effects of opening the
borders on the stability properties and steady state welfare of the
world economy. In autarky, as in Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010),
local indeterminacy, and therefore local sunspots fluctuations,
emerge around the unique steady state in the country with ef-
ficiency wages and involuntary unemployment, for intermediate
values of both the propensity to consume and the degree of ex-
ternalities. However, in our framework, a higher taste for variety,
hich is not present in Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010), reduces
he likelihood of local indeterminacy, stabilizing the economy.
his contrasts with Seegmuller (2008), where taste for variety,
nstead of labor externalities, is the distortion responsible for
ndeterminacy. In the country with a perfectly competitive labor
arket and full employment, the unique steady state is saddle
ath determinate in autarky. Given the asymmetry across the two
ountries in terms of local stability properties it is relevant to
5 International financial liberalization is a key feature of developed
conomies, where intra-industry trade is particularly relevant. A good example
s the case of the European Union. Therefore, it seems important to consider
nternational capital mobility when analyzing the effects of intra-industry trade.
6 Although we focus on fluctuations driven by changes in expectations, this
oes not mean that exogenous productivity and demand shocks play no role in
xplaining fluctuations in trade and macroeconomic variables. For example, in a
wo-country two-sector model without unemployment, Engel and Wang (2011)
ntroduce durable goods and productivity shocks, whereas Bai and Ríos-Rull
2015) consider goods market frictions and demand shocks.
7 In Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010), without taste for variety, there is no trade,
he current account balance reflecting only international payments of capital
ncome.
8 Goette et al. (2007) document the pervasiveness of real wage rigidity due
o efficiency wages or bargaining power of workers, namely in Germany, Italy
nd the UK.2
understand which type of dynamics will prevail under globaliza-
tion. Will saddle path stability emerge in the globalized world,
leading to the absence of expectations driven fluctuations as in
the closed full employment country? Or will world indeterminacy
and sunspot fluctuations occur as in the rigid wage country under
autarky? Will endogenous fluctuations due to supercritical bifur-
cations occur due to globalization even if the world equilibrium
is determinate? These are questions analyzed in this paper.
We find that the effects on stability of opening the borders
to both free intra-industry trade and capital mobility depend on
the existing degree of labor externalities and on the relative size
of the two economies. Globalization may bring local saddle path
stability to the world, eliminating local indeterminacy in the rigid
wage country, in particular if the full employment country is
sufficiently big in relative terms. In this case, the local stability
properties of the (big) full employment country are exported to
the other one, and the world economy is insulated from belief
driven local fluctuations. In contrast, if the rigid wage country is
big enough, local indeterminacy may prevail at the world level,
being exported from the country with rigid wages to the world
economy. In this case, the full employment country, which was
stable in autarky, will also face local expectation driven fluctu-
ations with origin in the other country. Hence, globalization in
economies with different degrees of rigidity in the labor market,
may stabilize or destabilize with respect to sunspots fluctuations
depending on their relative size. Furthermore, for any country
size, indeterminacy, and therefore local sunspots fluctuations at
the world level, require a smaller degree of externalities, more
likely to be compatible with empirical evidence. Also, bounded
deterministic and stochastic cycles associated with Hopf and flip
ifurcations, which did not exist in autarky, appear after opening
he borders, when the world steady state is locally determi-
ate, for empirically plausible low degrees of the productive
abor externality. This means that fluctuations in activity, em-
loyment and in the balance of trade, occur without shocks to
undamentals, or even in the absence of any uncertainty.9
We also show that, for a given degree of labor externalities,
a higher taste for variety promotes saddle-path stability under
free intra-industry trade with capital mobility. However, we also
find that when taste for variety is higher, indeterminacy and
Hopf or flip bifurcations, and their associated deterministic and/or
stochastic fluctuations, become possible with a lower, and more
plausible, degree of externalities. Hence, the effects of the degree
of taste for variety on the macroeconomic stability of the world
are ambiguous.
Previous studies on the effects of trade on the stability prop-
erties of trading countries obtained distinct results, depending
on the framework considered. See, for instance, Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002), Iwasa and Nishimura (2014, 2019) and Sim
and Ho (2007).10 When international capital mobility is also in-
troduced the results obtained tend to support the view that trade
is destabilizing, as in Nishimura et al. (2010, 2014) in a two-good,
two-factor model with infinitely-lived agents and Le Riche (2017)
9 Moreover, along these fluctuations we obtain a procyclical behavior of
xports generated by the existence of taste for variety and intra-industry trade,
n accordance with the pattern exhibited by data for developed economies.
ee De Bock (2010) and Engel and Wang (2011).
10 Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), considering a two-factor, two-sector,
wo-country model with infinitely-lived agents, where countries only differ
ith respect to their initial factor endowments, show that inter-industry trade
as no effect on the stability properties of both countries. However, Iwasa
nd Nishimura (2014, 2019), extending Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) by
ntroducing a consumable capital good, find that endogenous fluctuations may
merge in the world economy. In contrast Sim and Ho (2007), introducing differ-
nt technologies across countries (different degrees of productive externalities),
ind that saddle-path stability prevails in the world economy, even if before
rade one country exhibits sunspot fluctuations.
































































nd Le Riche (2020) in an overlapping generations framework.
owever, all these papers assumed inter-industry trade and an
nelastic labor supply. In contrast, in this paper we consider
ntra-industry trade with taste for variety and unemployment.
In terms of steady state effects of globalization, several natural
uestions arise. Will unemployment increase in the rigid wage
ountry? Will we observe a displacement of industries and jobs
rom the rigid to the flexible wage country? What happens to
eal wages, to the number of varieties, to output and to welfare
n the two countries? We show that employment decreases in
he country with efficiency wages, i.e. globalization exacerbates
nemployment in the rigid wage country. The number of firms,
nd therefore activity, is also reduced in that country. On the
ontrary, the number of varieties produced locally and the capital
tock increase in the country with a perfectly competitive labor
arket and full employment. Finally, the steady state welfare of
hose employed in the country with efficiency wages and invol-
ntary unemployment remains the same, while in the country
ith a perfectly competitive labor market and full employment
itizens are better off. These steady state results operate through
he interaction between differences in labor market rigidities
nd intra-industry trade with taste for variety.11 We conclude
hat intra-industry trade may not bring benefits for all countries
nvolved, hurting in particular those with labor market distor-
ions.12 The same conclusion was obtained by Boulhol (2011), in
static two-sector, two-country model. He finds that unemploy-
ent increases in the country with the rigid labor market after
pening the borders to bilateral inter-industry trade. Helpman
nd Itskhoki (2010), considering a static model with no capital,
lso find an asymmetric impact of trade: the country with lower
rictions in the labor market gains proportionately more.
We conclude that in the full employment country steady-
tate welfare increases with free (intra-industry) trade and capital
ovements, but endogenous macroeconomic fluctuations may
ecome more prevalent, i.e. there is a trade off between steady
tate welfare gains and (de)stabilization. On the other hand, for
he rigid wage country, opening the borders unambiguously re-
uces steady state welfare, intra-industry trade amplifying the
ffects of labor market rigidities on unemployment, without nec-
ssarily diminishing the likelihood of macroeconomic instability.
ur work improves therefore our understanding of the effects of
lobalization on (un)employment, stationary welfare and endoge-
ous fluctuations in the presence of taste for variety and labor
arket distortions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
resent the model and obtain the perfect foresight equilibrium
or the two economies in autarky, discussing local dynamics.
ection 3 provides the analysis of the two-country model. In
ection 4 we prove the existence of a unique steady state in
he two country model and we discuss the changes in steady
tate activity, employment and welfare resulting from opening
he economies. We analyze local dynamics of the two-country
odel and present the effects of intra-industry trade on stability
n Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Proofs are gathered
n Appendix A.
11 Indeed, Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010) with international capital mobility,
but no trade, find no changes in stationary welfare. Their autarkic steady state
and the steady state with international capital mobility are identical.
12 Rodríguez-Clare et al. (2020), considering a quantitative trade model for
he US economy, also find welfare losses in response to trade shocks for states
haracterized by downward nominal wage rigidity.3
2. Autarky
We consider two infinite horizon discrete time, one-sector
economies, country A and country B, that share the same produc-
tion structure. Both countries have monopolistic competition in
the output market and perfect competition in the capital services
market, only differing in the functioning of the labor market.
In country A there is involuntary unemployment with efficiency
wages, while full employment and perfectly competitive wages
prevail in country B. Households in both countries live for two pe-
riods, work when young and consume at each period a composite
good. This composite good is an aggregate of all the differentiated
goods (varieties) produced by firms, exhibiting taste for variety.
2.1. The model
In both countries population is constant over time and indi-
viduals live for two periods. In each period H j individuals are
born in country j ∈ {A, B}. In the first period of life, a young
employed agent that does not shirk, offers a unit of effort, re-
ceiving a wage income, wt . He uses this income to purchase
the composite consumption good, Ct , and to save in the form of
capital, K̃t+1, which he rents to firms in the following period. In
he second period of life, old retired agents use the rents received
o finance consumption, Dt+1. As usually done in the literature,
he composite good (Ct and Dt+1) is defined as an aggregate of
he quantities consumed of all the different varieties i produced






























where β ≥ 0, N is the number of varieties, and ε > 1 is the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between varieties.13
Following Bénassy (1996), we define the function t(N), which
represents the gain from consuming one unit of N different vari-
eties instead of consuming N units of a single variety. It follows
from the definition of the composite good given in (1) that t(N) =






If β is zero, households have no taste for variety while if β is
higher than zero, there is taste for variety.14
Agents have preferences defined over consumption in the first
period of life, Ct , consumption in the second period of life, Dt+1,
nd young age effort, et . A young agent born at period t solves






s.t. PtCt + Pt K̃t+1 = wt ,
Pt+1Dt+1 = rt+1K̃t+1,
Ct ,Dt+1, K̃t+1 ≥ 0,
(3)
here ν > 0 is the disutility of effort, α ∈ (0, 1) is the
ropensity to consume when young, et ∈ {0, 1} represents the
13 When ε > 1, the differentiated goods are substitutes.
14 Ardelean (2009) estimates consumer’s love for variety and suggests that va-
riety matters for both imported and domestically produced goods while Drescher
et al. (2008) present evidence on consumers’ preferences for variety in food
consumption.


























ffort supplied, rt+1 denotes the nominal rental rate of capital, wt
s the nominal wage and Pt represents the price of the composite
onsumption good.15
We adopt a two-stage maximization procedure. First, given a
ixed amount of the composite good, Ct and Dt+1 as defined in





































Second, he determines his intertemporal choice between con-
sumption when young and old and young age effort. Defining




first-order conditions can be written as:
Ct = αωt ,Dt+1 = (1 − α)ωtρt+1 and K̃t+1 = (1 − α)ωt . (6)
Plugging now the demands for the composite goods Ct and
Dt+1 into the utility function defined in (3), we obtain the lifetime
indirect utility function of a young agent that supplies a given
effort et :
V (ωt , ρt+1, et ) = αα(1 − α)1−αρ1−αt+1 ωt − νet . (7)
In the case of a young employed worker supplying et = 1, the
utility becomes






represents the real reservation wage. Note that, as the indirect
utility of an unemployed worker is zero, all youngsters are willing
to work when ωt > ω̄t , while for ωt < ω̄t the labor supply is zero.
As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we assume monopolistic com-
petition in the output market, where there are several firms,
each producing a differentiated good of the same industry.16 In
each period t = 1, . . . ,∞, entry and exit are free and the zero
profit condition determines the number of firms. Furthermore,
we consider the existence of labor externalities in production, as
in Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010) and in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007).









here s is the share of capital in total income, Θ is the total factor
productivity, ait = kit/lit the capital-labor ratio used by firm i,
Lt is aggregate employment which firms take as given, γ > 0
represents the degree of the labor externality and φ > 0 a fixed
cost.
15 The reader may note that our results would be the same if we had
considered instead a perfectly competitive market of a final good (with price
Pt ) produced out of the differentiated intermediate products according to (1).
16 As explained in Krugman (1980): “Because firms can costlessly differentiate
their products, and all products enter symmetrically into demand, two firms will
never want to produce the same product; each good will be produced by only
one firm’’.4
Aggregate production in period t , PtYt , is shared between





pityit = [LtCt + Lt It + Lt−1Dt ] Pt (11)
here Lt denotes employment at period t . We assume full de-
reciation of capital so that It = K̃t+1 and we consider that It

























It follows that the aggregate demand for variety i, υit , is given by








[Lt (Ct + It) + Lt−1Dt ] . (13)
Country A exhibits labor market rigidity due to the existence of
fficiency wages.17 As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), workers may
hirk and in that case the level of effort supplied is zero, i.e. eAt =
. A worker who shirks is caught with (ex-ante) probability λ ∈
0, 1). Firms fire immediately workers who are caught shirking,
ithout any wage, so that they get zero utility. A young agent
aces therefore three possibilities: (i) being unemployed, (ii) being
mployed and not shirking or (iii) being employed and shirking
eAt = 0, w
A
t > 0). Using the indirect utility function given
n (7), the utility of an employed worker who shirks is V e,s =
1 − λ)αα(1 − α)1−α(ρAt+1)
1−αωAt . Then, using (8), it is easy to see




, i.e. if real wages satisfy the No Shirking Condition
(hereafter NSC).
Since the output of a worker who shirks is zero, firms, in
order to maximize profits, take into account the NSC , so that the
wage chosen induces all works to exert effort. Hence, the problem

























where yAit is given by (10), and p
A




it , with the
emand function υAit given in (13).

























































t . Then, using


































17 Similar results would apply if we had instead considered monopoly unions
or search generated unemployment.








































On the contrary, in country B, we consider a perfectly competi-
tive labor market with full employment. Therefore, labor demand












)γ , where, at full employment equilibria wBt > ω̄Bt PBt ,


















)γ . Note that the markup factor in the
ifferentiated goods market is constant and given by ε/(ε − 1) in
oth countries.












and pBit = p
B


































From (16) and (17) the aggregate price P jt is equal to p
j
t at
the symmetric equilibrium when β = 0. However, if β > 0 the
aggregate price decreases with the number of varieties, as shown
in (5). Moreover, the real interest rate, ρ jt , and the real wage, ω
j
t ,
increase with the number of varieties N jt for j ∈ {A, B}.
In both countries the free-entry condition is determined by the










t = 0. Hence, using (10), and
the expressions obtained above for w and r , in (15) for A and in












From (10) and (18), we derive that the production level of each











− φ] = Θφ(ε − 1). (19)
.2. Country A - equilibrium with involuntary unemployment
In country A, at a symmetric equilibrium the aggregate de-




t . Using the
free-entry condition given in (18), and the fact that at the sym-




t , we obtain the number of varieties













Using (16) and (20), the real interest rate and the real wage can




























)s−γ (KAt )γ ≡ ω(aAt , KAt ).
(21)




= ω(aAt , K
A
t ),
ith the real reservation wage given by (9). We assume that





A, so that we obtain an equilibrium with unemployment.
ndeed, in contrast with perfect competition, wages are set as a
18 As usually done in the literature, we refrain from considering the condition
hat N should be an integer number. However, by choosing a sufficiently small φ,
e can ensure that the number of varieties is higher than one in both countries.5
mark up over the reservation wage, so that involuntary unem-
ployment emerges. It is worth noting that expectations influence
equilibrium through the labor market, since the reservation wage
and employment level at period t depend on ρAt+1, i.e. on the
expectations for the future real interest rate which, under perfect
foresight, coincide with its realized value.
In the capital services market, at equilibrium, aggregate de-














The dynamics of the economy are given by the labor market
quilibrium condition, ωAt =
ω̄At
λ
, and by the evolution of the
capital stock, KAt . We then define:
Definition 1. An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect fore-





t=0 which, given the initial capital stock K
A
t=0 > 0,
atisfies the capital accumulation equation and the labor market
quilibrium condition:




















where ω(aAt , K
A




t+1) are given by (21).
Eqs. (22)–(23) rule the dynamics of country A in autarky, and
efine a two-dimensional dynamic system with one predeter-
ined variable, aggregate capital, which is given by past savings.
n contrast, employment in t , and therefore aAt , are affected by
xpectations about the future real interest rate, opening the way
or expectations driven fluctuations.
.2.1. Steady state
A steady state of the dynamic system (22)–(23) is a solution
aA, KA) = (aAt , K
A
t ) for all t , such that
aA = (1 − α) ω(aA, KA), (24)
(1 − α)1−αααω(aA, KA)ρ(aA, KA)1−α = ν
λ
. (25)
This system only has one solution (aA, KA) as claimed in the
following Proposition.19
Proposition 1. There exists a unique stationary solution (aA, KA)

















Using (21), we can express the real interest rate as ρAt =
ωAt /[(1 − s)a
A
t ]. Substituting now (24) in this last expression




(1 − s)(1 − α)
. (28)
e shall consider that α is high enough so that the real interest
ate at equilibrium is positive, i.e. ρA > 1. In the following
Assumption we summarize the restrictions on the parameters’
values we will consider from now on.
19 Existence of equilibrium unemployment at the steady state is ensured by
ssuming that HA is high enough, so that LA = KA/aA < HA . Then, trajectories
that stay close to the steady state also exhibit unemployment.













ssumption 1. s ∈ (1/4, 1/2), 0 ≤ β < s/(1 − s) and 1 > α >
ax {(1 − 2s)/(1 − s), 1/2} ≡ α.
Under this Assumption, the conditions on s, i.e. on the capital
hare of output in the economy, ensure that it takes an empiri-
ally plausible value. See for example Cecchi and Garcia-Peñalosa
2010). The restriction on β stipulates that taste for variety is
not too high, in accordance with empirical findings. See Ardelean
(2009). Moreover, this restriction allows the equilibrium labor
(capital) demand curve to be downward sloping, by guaranteeing
that this is the case when γ = 0. As stated above we suppose that
the real interest rate is higher than one, i.e. that α > (1−2s)/(1−
s). Finally, we also assume, in accordance with most empirical
values obtained from national accounts of OECD countries, that
the propensity to consume when young is higher than 1/2.
Before proceeding to analyze the local dynamics, it is inter-
esting to discuss the effects of β - a novel feature of our work -
on steady state outcomes. Remark first that β does not influence
output per firm, which is constant (see (18) and (19)), nor aA (see
(22)), the real interest rate (see (28)) or the reservation wage
(see (9)). Therefore it neither influences the real wage ωA =
ω̄A
λ




can not change with β . From the last expression
e conclude that changes in LA and NA must go in the same
irection. Since (NA)β increases with β for a given NA higher than
ne, the product (NA)β (LA)γ will not remain constant if both NA
nd LA increase. We conclude therefore that NA and LA decrease
ith β . As taste for variety does not influence aA it holds that the
teady state capital stock, KA = LAaA, also decreases with β . One
would expect that a higher taste for variety would result in the
production of a higher number of varieties, and therefore in a
higher aggregate employment. However, we obtain the opposite
result. This happens because of the existence of real wage rigidity:
in country A the real wage is only influenced by the variables
and parameters that determine indirect utility and the mark-up
(and therefore the real reservation wage) and does not respond
to changes in any other variables or parameters.20 Hence, as the
interest rate also does not respond to changes in β , from problem
(3), we can see that individual demand for the composite goods C ,
D and K̃ , does not change. Noting that, from (1) at the symmetric
equilibrium, CA = (NA)1+βcA, as β increases the same amount of
the composite good can be obtained with less demand for each
variety. Accordingly, fims reduce production below the treshold
given in (19), making losses. Consequently, some producers exit
the market, and the number of varieties NA decreases.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention the effects of λ on sta-
tionary variables. Using (26), (27) and the definition of aA, it
holds that the capital-labor ratio, aA, the capital stock, KA, and the
level of employment, LA, decrease with λ. Moreover, from (20),
we also get that the number of varieties produced decrease. The
rationale for these results is the following. When λ increases the
real wage decreases. As the real interest rate does not change (see
(28)) firms will substitute capital by labor. Hence, employment
at the firm level, li, increases and capital intensity, aA, decreases.
Therefore, the marginal productivity of capital at the firm level
increases, which would lead ceteris paribus to a increase in the
real remuneration of capital. However, at the agregate level, the
number of varieties produced influences positively the real re-
muneration of capital through taste for variety (see (16)). It turns
out that the observed decrease in NA when λ increases is enough
to keep the interest rate constant. Finally note that, although
employment at the firm level increases with λ, employment at
20 Note that an increase in β acts as an increase in productivity, which we
know to have no influence on wages, when there is wage rigidity. t
6
Fig. 1. Stability triangle.
the economy level decreases with λ because, with taste for variety
and free entry, the number of firms significantly decreases.
2.2.2. Local dynamics and (in)determinacy
In this subsection we characterize the local dynamics of sys-
tem (22)–(23). We analyze the role of the propensity to consume
when young, α, of the degree of taste for variety, β , and of
the degree of increasing returns, γ , on the emergence of local
indeterminacy and expectation driven fluctuations. Remark that
since this system is loglinear, bifurcations are not possible. De-






















where J , given in Appendix A.1, is the Jacobian matrix of the
dynamic system. Then, the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 2. The characteristic polynomial of system (22)–(23)
is defined by P(λA) = (λA)2 − λAT + D, where the trace, T , and the
determinant, D, are given by:21
T = 1−α(1+β)(1+γ−s)(1−α)(1+γ−s)(1+β) , D =
s
(1−α)(1+γ−s) > 0. (30)
Proof. See Appendix A.1. □
Following Grandmont et al. (1998), we study the local stability
properties of our model, which are determined by the eigenvalues
of the characteristic polynomial P(λA) = (λA)2 − λAT + D,22 by
referring to the diagram represented in Fig. 1.
One eigenvalue is equal to 1 on the line AC (D = T − 1).
On the line AB (D = −T − 1) one eigenvalue is equal to −1.
On the segment BC the two eigenvalues are complex conjugates
21 Note that while the propensity to consume when young, α, the degree of
increasing returns, γ , and the capital share, s, influence both the trace and the
determinant, β , the degree of taste for variety only affects the trace. Moreover,
as both the trace and the determinant do not depend on the markup, λ, local
dynamics are not affected by its value.
22 Note that T and D correspond respectively to the product and sum of the
wo roots (eigenvalues) of the associated characteristic polynomial.
































ith modulus equal to 1. Therefore the steady state is a sink (both
igenvalues with modulus lower than one) when (T ,D) is inside
he triangle ABC . Since only capital is a predetermined variable,
hen the steady state is a sink, it is locally indeterminate23
nd there are infinitely many stochastic endogenous fluctuations
sunspots) arbitrarily close to the steady state.24 The steady state
s a source (both eigenvalues with modulus higher than one) if
T ,D) is above AB, AC and BC or below AB and AC . It is saddle
table (one eigenvalue with modulus higher than one and one
igenvalue with modulus lower than one) in the remaining cases.
n the Proposition below we present conditions on the parameters
nder which the steady state is a sink, a saddle or a source.











hen, in the country with rigid wages (country A), the following
enerically holds in autarky:
⌊i⌋ When α < α < α̃, for γ < γ aut1 the steady state is a
ource, becomes a sink (locally indeterminate) for γ aut1 < γ < γ
aut
2 ,
becoming a saddle for γ > γ aut2 .
⌊ii⌋ When α̃ < α < 1, for γ < γ aut2 the steady state is a source,
becoming a saddle for γ > γ aut2 .
Proof. See Appendix A.2. □
This Proposition shows that when α is not too low, nor too
high, local indeterminacy is possible. However, a minimal degree
of labor externalities, γ > γ aut1 > 0, is also necessary for
indeterminacy,25 as in Farmer and Guo (1994) with infinitely
lived agents, and Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010) or Lloyd-Braga
et al. (2007), with an overlapping generations framework.26 Note
however that, in the presence of empirically plausible values for
α which exceed 0.5, local indeterminacy remains possible, in the
country with labor market imperfections, for small increasing
returns.27 Proposition 3 also tells us that labor externalities can
not be too high for indeterminacy to occur, i.e. γ < γ aut2 .
In order to understand why indeterminacy requires a lower
bound and an upper bound on the labor externality, consider that
the economy is at the steady state in period t and suppose that
agents anticipate a raise in the future interest rate. According to
(9), the increase of the expected future interest rate, ρAt+1, will
decrease the current reservation wage, ω̄At , and the current wage,
ωAt , so that, considering the labor demand curve is downward
sloping, the current level of employment, LAt , will increase. Ac-
cordingly, current savings also rise implying an increase in the
future capital stock, KAt+1. When β = γ = 0 this increase will
unambiguously reduce the future interest rate, see (21), so that
expectations can not be fulfilled. However, in the presence of
taste for variety , β > 0, and/or labor externalities, γ > 0, this
increase in KAt+1 will shift the labor demand curve to the right,
increasing the future level of employment. Note that this increase
23 Indeterminacy occurs when the number of eigenvalues strictly lower than
ne in absolute value is larger than the number of predetermined variables.
24 See also Woodford (1986).
25 Note that, in contrast to Seegmuller (2008) who does not consider current
consumption (α = 0), positive labor externalities, γ > 0, are required to
btain local indeterminacy with plausible values for the propensity to consume
> α > 1/2.
26 As emphasized in Lloyd-Braga et al. (2007), the conditions for indeter-
inacy are similar in an overlapping generation model with a propensity to
urrent consumption compatible with what is observed in data, and in a model
f infinitely lived agents as the one explored in Farmer and Guo (1994). In
oth set ups considering a more elastic labor supply curve, which in our case
s infinitely elastic, reduces the lower bound for γ required for indeterminacy.
27 For example, when the share of capital in total income is 0.3 we have
α = 0.571, and considering α = 0.6 we have γ aut1 = 0.05. Considering a slightly
higher s = 1/3, and still considering α = 0.6, we have γ aut = 0.167.1
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will be higher for bigger values of γ . In turn, this increase in
future employment will increase the future real interest. There-
fore, if the positive effect on ρAt+1 is sufficiently high, i.e. if γ is
sufficiently big (γ > γ aut1 ), it may overcome the negative effect
due to the increase in capital in t + 1. As a result, in this last
case, expectations can be self-fulfilling. Local indeterminacy also
requires a future reversal in the trajectory so that, in the absence
of further shocks to expectations, the system will return to the
steady state. This implies that we must observe a decrease in the
future capital stock, that is the future wage bill must decrease.
For this to happen LAt+1 must not increase too much, i.e. γ can
not be too big (γ < γ aut2 ).
It is worth mentioning the role of taste for variety, β , on the
local dynamics of the autarkic system. Looking first at the critical
bounds of the labor externality, we can see that γ aut1 does not
depend on β , while γ aut2 is a decreasing function of β . Second,
note also that α̃, the upper bound on α above which indeter-
minacy does not emerge, decreases with β . Therefore, a higher
taste for variety reduces the likelihood of local indeterminacy,
by shrinking the interval of parameters’ values, under which
indeterminacy emerges, enlarging the set of parameter values for
which the steady state is saddle stable. Our results contrast with
those obtained by Seegmuller (2008) who finds that, when the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is one as in our
framework, taste for variety facilitates the emergence of local in-
determinacy in a closed economy.28 Note that the indeterminacy
mechanism considered in Seegmuller (2008) is totally different
from ours. In his framework indeterminacy does not require labor
externalities because he does not consider current consumption
(α = 0), i.e. the real interest rate is negative.
2.3. Country B - equilibrium with full employment
In country B the labor market is perfectly competitive and full
employment exists, so that LB = HB. Using (18) it follows that the









≡ NB(K Bt ).
(31)
Using (17) the real interest rate and the real wage can also be






















)s (HB)γ−s ≡ ωB(K Bt ). (32)
herefore, equilibrium dynamics in country B are totally deter-
ined by the evolution of capital.
efinition 2. An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight
nder autarky for the full employment country B is a sequence
K Bt
}∞
t=0, which given the initial capital stock K
B
t=0 > 0, satisfies
he capital accumulation equation:
K Bt+1 = (1 − α) ω
B(K Bt )H
B. (33)
ith ωB(K Bt ) given by (32).
This equation defines a one-dimensional system which char-
cterizes the dynamics of country B in autarky.
28 However, Seegmuller (2008) finds a result similar to ours when capital
and labor are sufficiently complementary, i.e. with an elasticity of substitution
smaller than 1/2.














































t+1 for all t , such that
K B = (1 − α) ωB(K B)HB. (34)
We can easily prove that:29
roposition 4. K B is a unique stationary solution of the dynamic





















From this last expression we can see that, as expected, the
umber of varieties in country B increases with taste for variety.
his contrasts with what happens in country A, where the number
f varieties (firms) decreases with β due to wage rigidity as
xplained before.
Note also that the steady state real interest rate in country
is identical to the steady state real interest rate of country A
iven in (28). Using (32), we can express country B’s real interest
ate as ρBt = sω
B
t H
B/[(1− s)K Bt ]. Substituting now (34) in this last
expression evaluated at the steady state we obtain:
ρB = ρA =
s
(1 − s)(1 − α)
. (37)
.3.2. Local dynamics and (in)determinacy









We can immediately see that, as the dynamic system is loglin-
ar, bifurcations are not possible. Moreover, under Assumption 1,
e can state the following.
roposition 5. Consider Assumption 1 satisfied. Then, the steady
tate of the full employment country B is stable as s (1 + β) < 1.
3. The two-country model
We consider a world economy with two countries, A and B,
which differ only in the functioning of their labor markets. We
suppose that capital is mobile across countries, which implies
that the nominal interest rates are equalized, i.e. rAt = r
B
t , while
abor is internationally immobile. Furthermore, goods are freely
raded, so that households, both from country A and country
, have access to all NWt varieties existing in the world, some






29 To guarantee that full employment exists at the steady state we ensure
hat ωB > ω̄B at the steady state by choosing a sufficiently small ν. Therefore
long trajectories sufficiently close to the steady state ωBt > ω̄
B
t .
30 Since each firm produces a specific differentiated product, varieties pro-
uced in A are different from the ones produced in B. Note that the same
appened in autarky. Indeed, as explained before, we consider the existence in
ach economy of a single productive sector featuring horizontally differentiated
oods, i.e. varieties with different attributes (quality, location, color, brand and
o on).8
Hence, in the world economy, the composite goods C jt and D
j
t+1
and investment I jt in country j ∈ {A, B} are defined as:















































The price of each variety is identical for all agents. Moreover, all
individuals share the same taste for variety and buy all varieties.
Hence, the price of the composite good, given in (5), which we
denote by PWt , is now defined over all varieties i = 1, . . . ,N
W
t ,
nd is identical for all households in the world. It follows that





















Therefore, the solution of the problem faced by the producer of
each differentiated good, in both countries A and B, is similar to
that under autarky. Indeed, producers of each variety face the
same aggregate demand, and produce an identical quantity at
the free-entry equilibrium, yjt = Θφ(ε − 1) as given in (19).
Equilibrium in the world output market is symmetric, pit = pt .
aking into account this last relation, together with international
apital mobility, rAt = r
B
t , using (15) for country A and country B,











where K jt denotes capital used in production in country j ∈ {A, B}.











t , it is possible to express a
A
t as a















≡ aA(KAt , K
W
t ). (43)
Using (18) as under autarky, (20) and (31) still apply. Taking




t , the number of varieties in the









]s−1−γ (KAt )1+γ + (HB)1+γ−s (KWt − KAt )s
εφ
≡ NW (KAt , K
W
t ). (44)
As pit = pt we obtain PWt = (N
W
t )
−βpt . This relation, together
with international capital mobility, implies that real interest rates
have to be identical across countries. Using (16) and (17) together
with (44), the world equilibrium real interest rate is given by:
ρW (KAt , K
W




































owever, real wages are different across countries:
ωA,W (KAt , K
W

















]s−γ (KAt )γ ,
ωB,W (KAt , K
W



































lthough they are linked by the following relationship:














The world equilibrium is given by two dynamic equations
escribing respectively the world capital accumulation that pre-
ails under international capital mobility and the labor market
quilibrium in country A.
Capital accumulation in the world is driven by the sum of
avings in both countries, i.e.:






















nd the labor market equilibrium in country A is given by

































given in (43), (45) and (46).
Definition 3. An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight







(48)–(49), given the initial world capital stock KWt=0 > 0.
Eqs. (48)–(49) define a two-dimensional dynamic system with
one predetermined variable, the world aggregate capital which is
given by past savings. However, capital used in production in each
country is a non predetermined variable as capital moves freely
across countries.31
3.2. Trade balance and capital flows
The trade balance of country j ∈ {A, B} in real terms, T Bjt ,
is defined as the country’s excess supply of goods. From the
aggregate production given in (11) we get that:

















When the trade balance of country j ∈ {A, B}, T Bjt , is positive
at equilibrium, the country j ∈ {A, B} is a net exporter of goods
as output is higher than domestic demand. Of course, in equilib-
rium, the sum of the two countries’ trade balances must be zero,
i.e. T BAt + T B
B
t = 0.
Using the budget constraint of households we can rewrite the
balance of trade as:













Recall that firms are subject to a free-entry condition so that






t . It follows that:









i.e. a surplus of the trade balance of country j implies that capital
used in production in that country, K jt , exceeds savings of its
residents, that were accumulated in the past, Ljt−1K̃
j
t . Denoting






t the inflows of capital services to country
j ∈ {A, B} in period t , we obtain





31 Without international capital mobility, factor prices still depend on the
umber of varieties in the world, but, as nominal interest rates are not equalized,
he traditional arbitrage condition (42) does not hold anymore. It follows that
he dynamic system would become three-dimensional, being characterized by
he capital accumulation of each country and the labor market equilibrium in
ountry A, with two-predetermined variables, the capital stock in each country.9
4. Steady state of the world economy
A steady state of the dynamic system (48)–(49) of the world
economy is a sequence (KAt , K
W
t ) = (K
A, KW ) for all t satisfying














(1 − α)1−αααωA,W (KA, KW )ρW (KA, KW )1−α = ν
λ
. (52)
The following Proposition establishes existence and unique-
ness of the steady state with open borders.
Proposition 6. Consider that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, there
exists a unique stationary solution (KA, KW ) of the dynamic system
of the world economy (48)–(49) given by
KW − KA =
[

































) (1 − α)(1 − s)1−α
ααs1−α
. (55)
Moreover, the steady state world real interest rate is identical to the
autarkic ones in both countries:
ρW = ρA = ρB =
s
(1 − s)(1 − α)
. (56)
roof. See Appendix A.4 □
Before opening the borders the steady state real interest rates
were already identical in both countries. Therefore there will be
no adjustments in savings/investment decisions and no incentives
for international capital movements once they are liberalized.
Naturally, the absence of capital movements at the steady state
implies that the world interest rate will not adjust, keeping a
value identical to the one observed under autarky. It also means
that, at the steady state, capital used in production equals savings
in both countries, so that capital inflows are zero, ηj = K j−LjK̃ j =
0, j ∈ {A, B}. Indeed, steady state savings in country A are given
by (1 − α)ωA,W LA. From (64) we have that ωA,W = aA/(1 − α).
Substituting this in the expression for savings we immediately
have that (1 − α)ωA,W LA = aALA = KA, i.e. capital accumulation
in country A equals savings in that country. Of course, as world
capital accumulation is equal to world savings, this implies that
the same happens in country B. Using (50) we also have that at
the stationary state the trade account is balanced.
Since each variety is only produced in one country (in one
firm) but, due to taste for variety, consumed in both countries,
each country exports the varieties it produces, importing the vari-
eties produced abroad. Therefore bilateral trade exists, due to the
existence of taste for variety, even at the steady state. However,
at the steady state the value of imports is identical to the value
of exports so that the steady state is characterized by no net
intra-industry trade. Nevertheless, as discussed in the next sec-
tion, non-steady state equilibria exhibit net trade. Also, net trade
would have been obtained at the steady state if the degree of taste



















































or variety was different across countries.32 We chose instead to
onsider identical fundamentals (preferences and technologies)
cross countries because this simpler framework is sufficient to
xplain the existence of bilateral trade, both at the steady state
nd along deterministic and stochastic fluctuations.
It is also interesting to analyze the effects of the degree of
aste for variety, β , on steady state equilibrium. Using (55) it is
easy to see that aA is not affected by β . In Appendix A.5, we
rove that steady state capital stock and employment in country
after opening the borders are smaller when β is higher. The
ame happens with the number of varieties produced in country
at the steady state with trade and capital mobility, which is
decreasing function of β .33 As in the autarkic equilibrium this
is due to the existence of wage rigidity. In contrast, in country
B, after opening the borders, the steady state capital stock and
varieties produced increase with β .34 This implies that NA/NB
ecreases with β . Denoting the share of varieties produced in




onclude that this share also decreases with β . As proved in
ppendix A.3, nA is also identical to KA/KW , the share of capital
sed in country A in total capital used in the world at the steady
tate. We use this share as a proxy of the relative economic size of
ountry A and, as we shall see, it influences our dynamic results.35
.1. Steady state effects of opening the borders
In this section we analyze the steady state effects of opening
he borders to intra-industry trade and to capital flows in both
ountries. Our main results are summarized in Proposition 7
elow.
roposition 7. Consider that Assumption 1 is satisfied and β > 0.
Then, the following results hold:
⌊i⌋ In country A at the free-trade steady state with capital mo-
bility, the capital stock, the number of varieties produced and em-
ployment are lower than their respective values at the autarkic
steady-state. The steady state real wage rate and the real interest
rate are identical at both steady-states. The world share of varieties
produced in country A, the world share of the capital stock of country
A and the world share of savings of country A are smaller than their
respective values at the autarkic steady state;
⌊ii⌋ In country B at the free-trade steady state with capital
mobility, the capital stock, the number of varieties produced, and
32 Suppose that taste for variety increases in country A. Then, as shown below,
A decreases. Country B imports less varieties, and becomes a net exporter of
oods, which corresponds to a deficit in the trade account of country A. Indeed,
hen β is different across countries, the price of the composite good, and hence
he real interest rate, are no longer equal across countries. A higher β in country
means that the price of the composite good in this country is lower than in
ountry B. Hence, the real interest rate will be higher in A. It can be shown that
his leads to an excess of savings over and above the amount of capital used in
roduction in this country. We then observe an outflow of capital from country
, which compensates its deficit in the trade account.
33 Using (20), we can see that if capital decreases with β the same happens
ith NA , as aA does not vary with β .
34 Indeed from (42) we can see that, as aA is not affected by β and as KA
decreases, K B must increase with β .
35 Finally, we mention the effects of λ on stationary variables. For country
A using (20), (54), (55) and the definition of aA , we find that, as in autarky,
he capital-labor ratio, aA , the capital stock, KA , the level of employment, LA ,
and the number of varities produced, NA , decrease with λ. The rationale is the
same as in autarky. See Section 2.2.1. However, in the globalized economy, the
change in NA , induced by a change in λ, also influences the steady state values
of country B. More precisely, the resulting contraction in economy A is exported
to country B. Using (20), (31), (45), (55), (70) and the definitions of NW and
aA , it follows that the capital stock, K B , and the number of varieties produced,
NB , also decrease with λ. Therefore the total number of varieties existing in the
world, NW , also decreases. w
10the real wage are higher than their respective values at the autarkic
steady-state. The real interest rate is identical at both steady-states.
The world share of varieties produced in country B, the world share
of the capital stock of country B and the world share of savings of
country B are higher than their respective values at the autarkic
steady state;
⌊iii⌋ The total number of varieties consumed in each country at
the free-trade steady state with capital mobility is higher than the
number of the varieties consumed in autarky in each country;
Proof. See Appendix A.6 and the paragraphs below. □
As referred before, varieties produced in A are different from
the ones produced in B, both under autarky and under free-trade.
Following openness, as stated in Proposition 7 above, intra-
industry trade destroys employment and firms (varieties pro-
duced) in the rigid wage country while it increases the number of
firms (varieties produced) in the full employment country. How-
ever, although in country A the number of varieties produced with
free trade is smaller than in autarky, households in A consume
more varieties after opening the borders as the total number
of varieties produced in the globalized world is higher than the
number of varieties produced in country A under autarky. See
Proposition 7 ⌊iii⌋. Moreover, as typically happens in models
of intra-industry trade where preferences and technologies are
dentical across countries, in our model the pattern of trade is
ndeterminate. See Krugman (1980). We are not able to determine
hich varieties are produced in each country.
Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010), considering a similar framework,
ut without taste for variety (β = 0) and no trade, find that the
utarkic steady state and the steady state with perfect capital
ovements coincide. It follows that all the steady state effects
tated in Proposition 7 above are due to the presence of intra-
industry trade with taste for variety, β > 0, and not associated
with capital mobility.36 The intuition is as follows. With taste
for variety, the number of varieties households are able to con-
sume with trade is naturally higher than under autarky. See
Appendix A.6. This would lead, if nothing else changed, to an
increase in real wages in both countries. See (46). However, in
country A, due to real wage rigidity this increase cannot hap-
pen.37 Since aA is the same before and after opening the borders,
and real wages are increasing in capital, capital must decrease in
A to compensate for the increase in varieties. See (46). This in turn
implies a lower level of employment. In country B, in contrast,
real wages increase with the number of varieties. However, the
interest rate remains identical to its steady state level under
autarky. See Proposition 6. Since the observed increase in the
number of varieties consumed after opening the borders pushes
the interest rate up, to counteract this increase, and since the real
interest rate is decreasing in capital, capital must increase in B,
ee (45), which reinforces the initial increase in wages in this
ountry. See (46). Note that in the absence of taste for variety,
= 0, the number of varieties no longer plays a role, and all
these effects would vanish.
Although our model is quite stylized, it is able to capture
some fears commonly associated with globalization/free-trade
agreements, that are based on the belief that opening the borders
36 Indeed, without capital mobility steady state real interest rates are still
dentical across countries. They are still given by (45), only depending on the
ropensity to save and on the capital share of output, which are the same in
he two countries. Therefore, with or without capital mobility, there will be
o capital flows at the steady state. Hence, steady state effects without capital
obility would be identical to those obtained with capital mobility.
37 Since the steady state real interest rate does not change after opening
he borders, the reservation wage remains the same and so does the real wage,
hich is a constant markup over the reservation wage.

























ill displace industries and jobs abroad, increasing unemploy-
ent. Indeed, in our framework this happens in the rigid wage
ountry.38 The reverse implication of this mechanism, is that
country without significant labor market rigidities, will suffer
rastic losses by reverting to an autarkic regime if most of the
rade is intra-industry. Egger et al. (2011), in a static model, show
hat free trade and capital mobility lead to a higher number of
arieties produced abroad when labor market rigidities increase
n the home country, a result consistent with ours, according
o which globalization leads to an increase in the number of
arieties produced in the flexible full employment economy.
It is also interesting to analyze the effects of trade on capital
ntensity at the firm level in both countries. In country B, as aggre-
gate employment is constant and the number of firms increases,
employment at the firm level decreases. However, as production
per firm is constant, (see (19)) capital per firm increases. There-
fore, firms in country B become more capital intensive. Indeed,
since in this country, ω/ρ, the ratio between real rages and the
real interest rate increases, firms will substitute labor for capital.
In contrast in country A, as ω/ρ does not change, capital intensity
at the steady state remains unchanged after opening the borders.
4.1.1. Stationary welfare
We now compare steady state welfare in the two countries
before and after the opening of the borders. In country A, as
the real interest rate and the real wage are identical before
and after trade, the utility of a worker that keeps its job when
there is trade is the same in the two steady states. However, as
employment is smaller in the steady state with free trade and
perfect capital mobility, and the utility of an unemployed worker
is zero, it follows that, under an utilitarian social welfare function,
aggregate utility decreases. In contrast, in country B, there is full
employment before and after opening the borders. As the real
wage is higher in the world steady state and the real interest
rate does not change, we conclude that individual and aggregate
utility increase with trade. The following Proposition summarizes
these results.
Proposition 8. Consider that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, the
following results hold at the steady state:
⌊i⌋ In country A, the utility level of a worker that keeps its
job when there is trade is the same as in autarky. However, those
workers that lose their jobs are worse off with free trade.
⌊ii⌋ All agents in country B gain from trade.
The full employment country is the one that unambiguously
benefits in terms of steady state welfare from free intra-industry
trade. In contrast, in country A we observe, due to the existence
of labor market distortions, an aggregate reduction in steady state
welfare after opening to trade. In economies with distortions such
as ours, benefits from trade are not guaranteed for all countries
(see Helpman and Krugman, 1985) so that this result should not
surprise us. However, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), considering
a static model with no capital, but with both intra and inter
industry trade between two countries that also differ in the
degree of labor market rigidities, find that both countries gain
from trade in welfare terms. Nevertheless, like us, they also find
an asymmetric impact of trade: the country with lower frictions
in the labor market gains proportionately more.
As it is well known, intra-industry trade influences welfare
through two channels: the scale effect and the variety effect. The
first one emerges because trade, increasing market size, allows
38 Boulhol (2011), in a static two-sector, two-country model also finds that
nemployment increases in the rigid wage country with bilateral inter-industry
rade.11firm to produce more, benefitting from scale economies. More-
over, with trade, each country gains access to a larger number
of varieties which increases utility in the presence of taste for
variety. In our framework, the scale of production at the firm level
is constant (see (19)), so that the scale effect is absent. Hence, we
are able to ensure that all the effects of intra-industry trade on
welfare operate via taste for variety.
5. Dynamics in the two-country model
We start by providing a full characterization of the local sta-
bility properties around the unique steady state equilibrium. We
first loglinearize system (48)–(49). Denoting percentage devia-





















here JW , given in Appendix A.7, is the Jacobian matrix of the dy-
amic system. The following Proposition gives the characteristic
olynomial.
roposition 9. The trace, TW , and determinant, DW , of matrix JW ,
iven below, correspond respectively to the sum and product of the
wo roots (eigenvalues) of the associated characteristic polynomial
W (λW ) ≡ (λW )2 − λWTW + DW :
TW = 1 − γ−n
A(1+γ−s)[(1+β)s−β]
(1−α)nA(1+β)(1+γ−s)(1−s)




here nA = NA/NW = KA/KW .39
roof. See Appendix A.7. □
As in autarky, we refer to Grandmont et al. (1998) in order
to appraise the local stability properties of the dynamic system
defined by (48)–(49). Note that, in contrast to what happened
in autarky, the dynamic system with trade and capital mobility
is not loglinear. Therefore, bifurcations are now possible. We
can use Fig. 1 to study local bifurcations. When a (bifurcation)
parameter is made to vary continuously in its admissible range,
if the values of TW and DW cross the interior of the segment BC ,
a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues crosses the unit circle
and a Hopf bifurcation generically occurs. In this case there are
deterministic cycles describing orbits that lie over an invariant
closed curve, surrounding the steady state, in the state space. If
the Hopf bifurcation is subcritical, this curve emerges when the
steady state is a sink. When the Hopf bifurcation is supercriti-
cal the invariant closed curve appears when the steady state is
determinate, a source, and although sunspot equilibria that stay
arbitrarily close to the steady state do not exist, there are never-
theless infinitely many equilibria exhibiting bounded stochastic
fluctuations around the invariant closed curve. Moreover, when
TW and DW cross the AB line, a flip bifurcation (supercritical
or subcritical) generically occurs, leading to the appearance of
deterministic cycles of period two. Moreover, a cascade of period
doubling cycles is expected to occur as the bifurcation parameter
moves further away from its bifurcation value, eventually leading
to the appearance of bounded aperiodic equilibrium trajectories.
In Proposition 10 we present our results, considering γ as
our bifurcation parameter. As usually done in the literature, we
consider the normalized steady state in country A with aA = 1 =
KA, by fixing the parameters λ and Θ at the appropriate level.
39 As in autarky β does not influence the determinant.










































hen we use the parameter HB to ensure that nA does not vary
ith the other parameters that influence directly the trace and
he determinant given in (58).40








and α̃ ≡ 1+2s(1+β)1+3s(1+β) . Then, the following generically holds at the world
evel:
⌊i⌋ When α < α < α̃, for γ < γW1 the steady state is a source,
ndergoes a Hopf bifurcation when γ crosses the critical threshold
W
1 , becomes a sink (locally indeterminate) for γ
W
1 < γ < γ
W
2 ,
undergoes a flip bifurcation when γ crosses the critical threshold γW2 ,
becoming a saddle for γ > γW2 .
⌊ii⌋ When α̃ < α < 1, for γ < γW2 the steady state is a source,
undergoes a flip bifurcation when γ crosses the critical threshold γW2 ,
becoming a saddle for γ > γW2 .
Proof. See Appendix A.8. □
This Proposition shows that, in the presence of intra-industry
trade and free international capital flows, the world economy,
i.e. not only country A, but also country B, can exhibit local
fluctuations driven by changes in expectations.41 This will occur
through bifurcations, that were not possible in autarky, and/or
when the world equilibrium is locally indeterminate (a sink).
Indeterminacy, as in autarky, requires intermediate values of the
propensity to consume of a young agent, α < α < α̃ and a
ower and an upper bound for the labor externality, γW1 and γ
W
2
respectively. Although the bounds on the propensity to consume
are the same as the ones in autarky, the bounds on the labor
externality are different, depending on the value of nA. It follows
that the effects of opening the economies on local stability, can
be studied by comparing the critical values for γ , γW1 and γ
W
2 ,
with the relevant critical values in autarky, γ aut1 and γ
aut
2 . Con-
centrating in the case α < α < α̃, under Assumption 1, γW1 > 0
is an increasing function of nA, becoming identical to γ aut1 for
nA = 1. Therefore we have γW1 < γ
aut
1 . Similarly γ
W
2 > 0 is an
increasing function of nA, becoming identical to γ aut2 for n
A
= 1.
Therefore we have γW2 < γ
aut
2 . However, γ
W
2 can be higher or
lower than γ aut1 , depending on the value of n
A. Accordingly we
have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Assume that α < α < α̃ and consider Assumption 1






[1 + s(1 + β)][α(1 − s) − (1 − 2s)]
s [2(1 + β)[(1 − α)(1 − s) + s] − β]
we have:
⌊i⌋ For nA < nA
∗







⌊ii⌋ For nA > nA
∗







40 Using (55) and aA = 1, we get λ = ν (1−α)(1−s)
1−α
αα s1−α





















)(1−s)/(1+γ−s) , the value of the parameter nA ≡ NA/NW =






1+γ−s . Hence, as γ is made to vary, nA is kept constant as
long HB takes values in accordance with the last expression. Finally, with the
normalization procedure followed neither λ and Θ nor HB influence the local
stability properties of the model.
41 Indeed, as discussed below, changes in expectations in country A will
trigger changes in the number of varieties produced and in the capital used by
firms in A, which through trade and capital mobility will also influence economic
activity in country B.125.1. Effects of opening the economies on stability
From Proposition 10 and Lemma 1, it follows that the relative
size of the two countries will influence the results. To facilitate
the analysis we present in Fig. 2, in the space (nA, γ ), the critical
values of γ delimiting the regions where the steady state is locally
a source, sink and saddle, both under autarky (for country A)
and after opening the borders (in the World, W ), considering
α < α < α̃. To further ease the discussion we provide a numerical
illustration. In accordance with Assumption 1, we consider s =
1/3, a sufficiently small value for β = 0.01, and α = 0.6 ∈
(α = 0.5, α̃ = 0.833), so that γ aut1 = 0.167, γ
aut
2 = 5.95 and
nA
∗
= 0.222. In order to concentrate the discussion on empirically
plausible values for the parameters, in Fig. 2 we will only consider
values for γ below s = 1/3,42 i.e. γ aut2 will not be depicted.




, 1) the value of nA such that




The first result we highlight is that, after opening the borders,
country A may become saddle determinate for empirically plau-
sible values of the parameters. In terms of Fig. 2, this will occur
in the region to the left and above the red line representing γW2 .
Since γW2 decreases as nA decreases, we conclude that the bigger
the size of country B, the more likely is local saddle determinacy
in a globalized world. In this case the local stability properties
of country B are exported to country A. In contrast, in the region
to the right of the γW2 schedule, country B may become locally
indeterminate, or even a source. In this case the local stability
properties of country A, are exported to country B.
Let us now consider values of γ > γ aut1 = 0.167 so that in
autarky the steady state was locally indeterminate in country A.
We find that, after opening the borders, the set of values of γ
under which indeterminacy emerges shrinks as the steady state
in both countries becomes a saddle for γ > γW2 . Moreover if
nA is sufficiently small, nA < nA
∗
= 0.222, local indeterminacy
nd therefore sunspots fluctuations are totally eliminated in the
orld.43 However, if nA is sufficiently big, namely nA > nA
∗∗
=
.371, local indeterminacy prevails in the world. In this case there
xists a transmission of local indeterminacy from country A to
ountry B, so that expectation driven fluctuations, with origin in
ountry A will be exported to country B, which was stable in
utarky.44
We consider now lower and more plausible values of γ <
aut
1 = 0.167. After opening the borders, indeterminacy which
as not possible in autarky can now emerge. Indeed, the lower
ound on γ required for indeterminacy is lower in a globalized
orld, i.e. γW1 < γ
aut
1 . Therefore, with free-trade and capi-
al movements it is possible to obtain fluctuations driven by
elf-fulfilling volatile expectations with small values of labor ex-
ernalities consistent with empirical evidence.45 To obtain γW1
nd γW2 we will consider two values for n
A, nA = 0.1 and
A
= 0.3, respectively below and above nA
∗
. For nA = 0.1, we
btain γW1 = 0.0136 and γ
W
2 = 0.0658, while for n
A
= 0.3
e obtain γW1 = 0.043, and γ
W
2 = 0.246. We confirm therefore
42 Most of empirical estimates for the degree of increasing reurns to scale
oint to small values only slightly higher than zero, and values higher that
/3 are usually considered highly implausible. See Basu and Fernald (1997)
nd Burnside (1996).
43 The same result has been found in Sim and Ho (2007) who consider
nter-industry trade and different technologies across countries.
44 The same result was obtained by Nishimura et al. (2010) who, using
two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium model with sector
pecific externalities, found that some country’s expectation-driven fluctuations
an spread throughout the world once inter-industry trade opens, even if the
ther country has determinacy under autarky.
45 This result was also emphasized in Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010) with
erfect capital mobility but no trade.































Fig. 2. Local dynamics for α ∈ (α, α̃), β = 0.01, α = 0.6 and s = 1/3.s
hat, after opening the borders to intra-industry trade and capital
obility, indeterminacy becomes possible for lower values of γ ,
n accordance with empirical evidence.
Another important result is that, after opening the borders,
ifurcations, which in our framework did not occur in autarky,
ecome possible. When γ crosses the critical value γW1 a Hopf
ifurcation occurs, whatever the relative size of the two countries
rovided α < α < α̃. In all our simulations the Hopf bifurcation
s supercritical, so that the invariant closed curve appears when
he steady state is a source. With nA = 0.1, the Hopf bifurcation
ccurs when γ = γW1 = 0.0136, and for γ = 0.0132 we obtain
n invariant closed curve surrounding the steady state, which
e depict in Fig. 3.46 This means that non-explosive determin-
stic and stochastic47 fluctuations become possible in the world
conomy for small and plausible values of γ . To our knowledge,
urs is the first paper highlighting that, by opening the economy,
luctuations due to a Hopf bifurcation emerge.48
Moreover, for nA < nA
∗∗
, when γ crosses the critical value γW2 ,
flip bifurcation occurs.49 In our simulations the flip bifurcation is
upercritical. With nA = 0.1, the flip bifurcation occurs when γ =
W
2 = 0.0658.
50 In Fig. 4 we depict the corresponding bifurcation
iagram for values of γ sufficiently close but above γW2 , i.e. in
he saddle region. We can observe a cascade of doubling periodic
ycles.51
46 For nA = 0.3 the supercritical Hopf occurs for γ = γW1 = 0.043 and the
invariant closed curve appears for γ = 0.0419.
47 Around the invariant closed curve, there exist infinitely many equilibria
exhibiting bounded stochastic fluctuations. See Grandmont et al. (1998).
48 Note that fluctuations along the invariant closed curve appear near unit
oots through the Hopf bifurcation, and that equilibria along the invariant closed
urve can be represented by quasi periodic orbits. Hence, Hopf bifurcations lead
o persistent and irregular fluctuations, features exhibited by real data on output
usiness cycles.
49 Nishimura et al. (2014), with inter-industry trade and capital movements,
lso obtain a flip bifurcation, in a two-factor, two-sector, two-country model
ith decreasing returns to scale technologies. However, they do not have local
ndeterminacy.
50 With nA = 0.3, the flip bifurcation occurs when γ = γW2 = 0.246.
51 Stochastic bounded fluctuations around the periodic cycles also appear.
ee Grandmont et al. (1998).13It is also important to discuss the role of taste for variety, β , on
tability in a globalized world. While γW1 does not directly depend
on β , γW2 is a decreasing function of it, so that in Fig. 2 we would
observe a rightward shift of the γW2 schedule when β increases.
We can also see that the critical value nA
∗∗
increases with β . This
would imply, other things being equal, that a higher taste for
variety shrinks the sink region, which would reduce the likelihood
of local sunspots fluctuations, and enlarges the region where we
obtain saddle path stability, exerting therefore a (local) stabilizing
effect. Although the normalization used keeps constant the value
of nA when β varies, in Section 4 we found that nA decreases
with β . Considering a fixed value of γ , this last indirect effect,
moving in Fig. 2 the relevant point to the left, reinforces the direct
effect as the likelihood of falling into the saddle region increases.
However, an increase in β decreases γW1 (through n
A only) and
γW2 (directly and also through n
A). Therefore, with intra-industry
trade, an increase in taste for variety makes indeterminacy and
Hopf or flip bifurcations, and their associated deterministic and
stochastic cycles, possible with lower and more plausible val-
ues of γ . Hence, the effects of taste for variety on stability are
ambiguous.
Finally, we address the case where α̃ < α < 1, so that
Proposition 10 ⌊ii⌋ applies. We can see that after opening the
borders, country A may become saddle determinate for plausible
and sufficiently small values of γ . However, flip bifurcations
occur. In our simulations these bifurcations were subcritical, so
that endogenous fluctuations appear when the steady state is a
saddle. Therefore we can not simply conclude that opening the
borders exerts a stabilizing influence.
Summarizing, although indeterminacy that existed under au-
tarky in country A can be eliminated after opening the borders,
the steady state becoming saddle stable, this only happens if
country B is sufficiently large. On the other hand, for lower and
plausible values of γ , local indeterminacy and sunspots arbitrarily
near the steady state can now emerge. Also, bounded determin-
istic and stochastic fluctuations associated with a supercritical
Hopf bifurcation are now possible. Furthermore, for higher val-
ues of γ , but still within the plausible range, deterministic and
stochastic fluctuations when the steady state is a saddle, due
to a supercritical flip bifurcation also occur. We further notice
that, after opening the borders, local indeterminacy and flip/Hopf































ifurcations may also appear in country B, triggering endogenous
luctuations that could not exist under autarky.
We now highlight that net trade and the creation/destruction
f new varieties emerge along trajectories that exhibit endoge-
ous fluctuations. In the following we provide an example as-
ociated with indeterminacy where local fluctuations driven by
hocks to expectations exist. At the steady state, in each country,
ouseholds save in capital what is needed to use in production.
ence, as we have seen, there are no capital movements across
ountries at the steady state, and net trade is zero as well.
owever, changes in expectations in the rigid wage country lead
o fluctuations in activity, inducing net trade and changes in the
emuneration of factors in both countries. Departing from the
teady state, suppose that, suddenly, expectations of the future
eal interest rate increase. In country A, the reservation wage
ecreases (see (9)) and so does the real wage. For a given level
f the capital stock, KAt , and of the number of varieties produced
n both countries, NAt and N
B
t , and considering that at a symmetric14quilibrium the labor demand is downward sloping (which occurs
ith γ small), employment at the firm level in country A, lAt ,
ncreases.52 Hence, ceteris paribus, average costs decrease and
rofits increase at the firm level. This induces the entry of new
irms and therefore the production of more varieties in country
,53 a part of which is exported. Country A becomes therefore a
et exporter of goods. At the same time, the observed increase in
A
t leads, if everything else is equal, to an increase in the marginal
roductivity of capital in country A, and consequently in rAt , the
urrent interest rate in country A. This in turn triggers inflows
f capital from country B until interest rates are equalized in the
wo countries, which leads to fluctuations in wages and activity
n country B as well. Finally, it is also worth emphasizing that our
52 To see this note that adapting (16) to the case where NWt varieties are













53 Since output per firm is constant, this implies that aggregate output in
country A unambiguously increases.






























odel’s features make it appropriate to describe what happens in
eveloped countries, where intra-industry trade is more prevalent
and where we observe diversified labor market institutions and
where, as shown in De Bock (2010) and Engel and Wang (2011),
and in contrast to what happens in developing countries, exports
are procyclical. Indeed, intra-industry trade seems to be appro-
priate to explain this last characteristic. In fact, as seen above,
output increases when the number of varieties increases (since
the quantity produced by each variety or firm is constant). As
with taste for variety these varieties are always imported by the
partner country, we conclude that one country’s exports naturally
increase with the number of varieties it produces, and therefore
with the level of its output.54
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we consider a two-country, two-factor, overlap-
ping generations model with taste for variety, imperfect compe-
tition and increasing returns to scale. We also assume that the
two countries have different labor market characteristics: in one
country, A, there are efficiency wages and unemployment, while
in the other country, B, there exists full employment. We first
show that in autarky country B is locally stable, while in country
A local indeterminacy, and therefore belief driven fluctuations,
may emerge, provided the propensity to consume and the degree
of increasing returns to scale take intermediate values, although
bifurcations are not possible. When trade and capital movements
are liberalized, the effects on stability depend on the relative
size of the countries and on the existing degree of increasing
returns to scale. Considering a parameterization under which
indeterminacy existed in country A in autarky, we show that,
if country A is sufficiently big, it will export local fluctuations
to the full employment country B, globalization inducing local
macroeconomic instability in the world. In contrast, provided
country B is big enough, local indeterminacy that existed in
autarky in country A is eliminated, globalization having in this
case a (local) stabilizing effect in the world economy. However,
whatever the relative size of the two countries, indeterminacy,
and therefore local sunspots fluctuations at the world level, re-
quire a degree of externalities smaller than the one needed in
autarky. Also bounded deterministic and stochastic fluctuations
associated with Hopf and flip bifurcations, which did not exist in
autarky, become possible in the world economy for sufficiently
small values of increasing returns consistent with empirical es-
timates. This means that fluctuations in economic activity and
in intra-industry trade emerge without shocks to fundamentals,
and even without uncertainty, for empirically plausible values of
the parameters. In terms of steady state welfare, we prove that
the full employment country unambiguously gains from opening
its borders, while unemployment increases in the country with
labor market rigidities, reducing country welfare. Furthermore,
we show that intra-industry trade alone is responsible for these
welfare gains and losses.
Very few papers in the literature have simultaneously ad-
dressed the effects of trade on welfare and on stability properties.
Two examples are Nishimura et al. (2010) and Le Riche (2020).
However, they consider inter-industry trade and no unemploy-
ment. Moreover, the models used and the mechanisms empha-
sized are different from ours. They consider perfectly
competitive labor markets in both countries and assume that
54 This also happens when simulating the model along deterministic trajec-
tories. The correlation between output and exports obtained along the invariant
closed curve (γ = 0.0132) and along a period four cycle (γ = 0.07) were 0.98
nd 0.67 respectively. In these simulations we considered as above s = 1/3,
= 0.01, α = 0.6 and nA = 0.1.15ountries have different technologies. Both papers find that open-
ng to inter-industry trade with capital mobility increases the
ikelihood of local indeterminacy, that one country will gain in
erms of stationary welfare while the other country always looses,
lthough Nishimura et al. (2010) also show that at the world level
teady state welfare increases. Considering instead intra-industry
rade and introducing labor market imperfections in one local
arket, our findings, while mostly supporting these previous
nsights, highlight the role of the relative size of the countries
nd of the degree of increasing returns to scale on shaping the
ffects of globalization on stability. Therefore, a fruitful extension
f the model could be to understand how the interaction between
omparative advantage (inter-industry trade), increasing returns
o scale and taste for variety (intra-industry trade) affect the
tability and the welfare of the trading economies.
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ppendix A
.1. Proof of Proposition 2
























ubstituting Eqs. (20) and (21) into the dynamic system (22)–(23),
inearizing it and using (59) and (60) we obtain
A
t+1 = (1 + β)(1 + γ )  
z1




(1 − α) [β(1 + γ ) + γ ]  
x1
K̂At+1 −(1 − α)(1 + β)(1 + γ − s)  
x2
âAt+1 =
− [β(1 + γ ) + γ ]  
z3
K̂At + [β(1 + γ − s) − (s − γ )]  
z4
âAt
where K̂At and â
A
t denote percentage deviations of K
A and aA from























he Jacobian matrix, J , is then





















The trace, T , and determinant, D, of matrix J , correspond respec-
tively to the sum and product of the two roots (eigenvalues) of
the associated characteristic polynomial P(λ) ≡ λ2 − λT + D.
Results follow.





































.2. Proof of Proposition 3
Local indeterminacy emerges when the steady state is a sink,
i.e. when D < 1, 1+T+D > 0 and 1−T+D > 0. Local determinacy
will arise for any other configuration. In particular, as D > 0, the
steady state is a saddle when 1− T + D < 0 or 1+ T + D < 0. In
any other configuration the steady state will be a source.
From (30), we get that the determinant is lower than one if
and only if γ > [α(1 − s) − (1 − 2s)]/(1 − α) ≡ γ aut1 . Such a
threshold is positive under Assumption 1. Furthermore, from (30),
we can compute 1 − T + D and 1 + T + D:
1 − T + D = γ+β(1+γ )(1−α)(1+γ−s)(1+β) > 0,
1 + T + D = 1+(1+β)[1+γ−2α(1+γ−s)](1−α)(1+γ−s)(1+β) ≷ 0.
(61)
We have 1+ T +D > 0 when γ < γ aut2 ≡
2(1−α+αs)−β[2α(1−s)−1]
(1+β)(2α−1) >
under Assumption 1.55 As 1 − T + D > 0, when γ <
in
{




we get D > 1 and 1 + T + D > 0, and thus
he steady state is a source. When γ aut1 < γ < γ
aut
2 , we obtain
< 1 and 1+ T +D > 0. It follows that in this configuration the
teady state is a sink. When γ > γ aut2 , we get 1 + T + D < 0 so
that the steady state is a saddle. Noting that γ aut1 < γ
aut
2 requires
α < α̃ ≡
1+2s(1+β)
1+3s(1+β) , results follow.
.3. Proof that nA = χA = SA
Denote by nA ≡ NA/NW the percentage of varieties produced
n country A at the steady state, by SA ≡ (1 − α)ωA,W LA/KW the
teady state share of country A savings in world savings, and by
A
≡ KA/KW the share of capital used in country A in total capital
sed in the world at the steady state. We will start by showing
hat nA = χA. First, substituting (42) in (44) evaluated at the














s χA = K
A
KW







s nA = N
A
NW
, gives nA = χA.
We now show that nA = SA. Using (20), (21), (31), and (32) at






























this obviously means that nA = SA so that the
laim nA = χA = SA is true.
.4. Proof of Proposition 6
Denote by SA ≡ (1 − α)ωA,W LA/KW the steady state share of
country A savings in world savings, and by χA ≡ KA/KW the share
of capital used in country A in total capital used in the world at










nd from Appendix A.3 we have SA = χA, we conclude that
55 Indeed the numerator of γ aut2 is positive under Assumption 1. Either
α(1 − s) < 1, so that the numerator is positive or since Assumption 1 implies










= 1 − χA = K
B
KW















ombining (45) and (46), and using the last expression we have







(1 − s)(1 − α)
(65)
o that ρW = ρA = ρB. Now, using also (52), we obtain the steady
tate value of the capital-labor ratio in country A given by (55).
ote that it is identical to the value obtained in autarky.
We now prove uniqueness of the steady state. First, substitut-
ng Eqs. (44), (45) and (46) into (48)–(49) we rewrite our dynamic


































(1 − α)(1 − s)1−α
[







t the steady state system (66) becomes:




































Substituting Ψ1 and Ψ3 in the previous expression, and using (55),






















Under Assumption 1 the derivative of the RHS of the previous
expression is unambiguously positive. Moreover, the RHS tends
o 0 when KA tends to 0 and it tends to +∞ when KA tends to
∞, implying that the RHS is an increasing function going from
to +∞. Since the LHS is a positive constant, it follows that there





























xists a unique KA solution of that equation. As from (67) we
ave that KW is uniquely determined by KA we conclude that the
teady state is unique.
.5. Proof that KA and LA decrease with β



















We have proved above that the RHS of this expression is an
ncreasing function of KA. Therefore the steady state level of
apital in country A is determined by the intersection of this






(1+γ−s) > 1. Indeed, using (20) this inequality can be
rewritten as NA > 1, which is always satisfied. We conclude
that the term in square brackets in the RHS is higher than one.
Therefore, the increasing function of KA in the RHS of this last
expression shifts up when β increases. This implies that KA de-
creases with β . As aA is not affected by β , LA also decreases with
β .
A.6. Proof of Proposition 7
With intra-industry trade and free capital movements the
number of varieties in the world which are consumed by resi-







, is given by (44) evaluated at steady state, that, using
























et NBaut denote the number of varieties produced at the steady
tate in country B in autarky. In country B, as NB > NBaut , we
immediately conclude that NW > NBaut , i.e. at the steady state
residents in country B consume more varieties after opening its
borders to free trade and capital movements. The number of
varieties in country A under autarky is given by (20). Since aA is
the same in autarky and after opening the borders, and denoting
by NAaut the number of varieties produced at the steady state in
country A in autarky and by KAaut the steady state capital stock of
















)1+ γ1−s] βγ+(1+γ )β
. (71)
ote that as the RHS is higher than one it follows that the steady








)1+ γ1−s] β(1+γ )γ+(1+γ )β
,
.e. the number of varieties produced in A decreases with free























)1+ γ1−s] γγ+(1+γ )β
> 1.
We conclude that, although the number of varieties produced in A
decreases with free intra-industry trade and capital mobility, the
residents of country A have access and consume more varieties at
the steady state after opening the borders.
Finally, we have that NA/NB = nA/(1 − nA). As NA decreases
ith trade and NB increases with trade, NA/NB decreases with
rade. Since NA/NB is an increasing function of nA, it follows that
A decreases and nB = 1− nA increases with trade. As nA = SA =
A (see Appendix A.3) this also means that the steady state share
f savings of country A, SA, and the steady state share of capital
f country A, χA, decrease, while the steady state share of saving
f country B, 1− SA, and the steady state share of capital stock of
ountry B, 1 − χA, increase.
.7. Proof of Proposition 9
Linearizing the dynamic system (66) we obtain
W
t+1 =
(1 + β)(s − nA)
1 − nA  
zW1
K̂Wt +
(1 + β)(1 − s)nA




1 − s − βs + βnA




1 − nA  
xW2
K̂At+1 =
β(1 + γ − s)(s − nA) + (1 − s)(s − γ )




γ − nA {γ + (1 − s)[s − γ − β(1 + γ − s)]}
(1 − nA)(1 + γ − s)(1 − α)(1 + β)(1 − s)  
zW4
K̂At
where K̂Wt and K̂
A
t denote percentage deviations of K
W and KA
from the steady state.

















































































The trace, TW , and determinant, DW , of matrix JW , correspond
espectively to the sum and product of the two roots (eigen-
alues) of the associated characteristic polynomial PW (λW ) ≡
λW
)2
− λWTW + DW .
Results follow.
.8. Proof of Proposition 10
The steady state is a sink when, at the same time, DW < 1,
1 + TW + DW > 0 and 1 − TW + DW > 0. In that case
ocal indeterminacy emerges. Local determinacy will arise in the
emaining cases. In particular, the steady state is a saddle when,
imultaneously, 1 + TW + DW > 0 and 1 − TW + DW < 0 or
+TW+DW < 0 and 1−TW+DW > 0. In any other configurations,
he steady state will be a source.
Using (58) we have that DW is lower than one if and only
f γ > n
A(1−s)[α(1−s)−(1−2s)]
s−nA[α(1−s)−(1−2s)]
≡ γW1 , where γ
W
1 is the value
f γ for which DW = 1. Such a threshold is positive under
ssumption 1.56 Furthermore, from (58), we can compute
− TW + DW =
nAβ(1 + γ − s) + γ [1 − s(1 + β)]




1 + TW + DW
=
nA(1 + γ − s) {2(1 + β) [(1 − α)(1 − s) + s] − β} − γ [1 + s(1 + β)]






have that 1 + TW + DW > 0 when γ < γW2 under Assumption 1.
Remark that γW2 is the value of γ for which D
W
= −1 − TW . As
we always have 1 − TW + DW > 0, we conclude that:
(i) the steady state is a source when DW > 1 and 1 + TW +







(ii) the steady state is a sink when DW < 1 and 1+TW +DW >
0, i.e. when γW1 < γ < γ
W
2 ;
(iii) the steady state is a saddle when 1 + TW + DW < 0,
i.e. when γ > γW2 .
Noting that γW1 < γ
W
2 requires α <
1+2s(1+β)
1+3s(1+β) , results follow.
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